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Abstract
Three situations associated with making decisions on investing in the development of a regional electrical grid are considered,
and a game-theoretic approach to establishing the expediency of the investment in the grid and to ﬁnding optimal investment
strategies for both the government and private investors in these situations is outlined. The implementation of this approach
is associated with formulating and solving particular games on polyhedral sets of player strategies that are presented and
discussed.
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1. Introduction
Developing new and improving already existing regional electrical grids always implies providing a certain
level of investments in new technologies of and equipment for electricity production and transmission by both
interested ﬁnancial institutions and private investors. So recently, a rapid penetration of renewable sources of
energy and systems for storing electricity in the structure of regional electrical grids has also drawn attention
of potential investors to problems of estimating the proﬁtability of investing in the development of such sources
and systems. In all these problems, ﬁnding whether any investment in a) renting, acquisition, and production
of particular systems for transforming solar and wind energy into electricity, and b) renting, acquisition, and
production of electricity storing systems is proﬁtable, and ﬁnding optimal investment strategies when such an
investment is proﬁtable, presents interest for both local and central governments, for business communities, and
for the ﬁnanciers in the energy sector of national economy in every country.
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Depending on what estimates of the needed investment volume in the development of a regional electrical grid
are, three situations may emerge. In the ﬁrst one, individual electricity producers or groups of them, transmitting
companies, and large (mostly) industrial grid customers may turn out to be both capable of making their invest-
ments in particular parts or elements of the grid and interested in doing this at the required investment scale. They
may provide the needed volume of investment either with the use of their own money only or by borrowing a
part or all the money to be invested. In the second situation, a regional government with (or without) any support
from the central government may be capable of making all or some of the investments in the grid that are needed.
Finally, in the third situation, neither the private sector alone nor the regional and the central governments (even to-
gether) can provide the whole amount of the investment needed. If this is the case, a form of a partnership between
the private and the public sector is expedient to raise an appropriate amount of money to invest in developing the
grid.
In all the three situations, to quantitatively estimate both the maximum return on investment and the investment
strategies leading to receiving this return, certain mathematical tools are needed. A game-theoretic approach to
developing such tools is proposed, and the structure and features of the corresponding games are discussed in the
present paper.
2. Finding optimal investment strategies of service providers in developing a regional electrical grid
In [1], it is proposed to consider the interaction between electricity producers and electricity consumers in the
grid (both individual and group ones) on any particular time segment as a two-person, non-cooperative game on
disjoint player strategies in the following form
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
〈x˜,Dy〉 + 〈v, x˜〉 → maxx˜∈M˜
〈x˜,Dy〉 → miny∈Ω .
Here
a) a part of the components of the vector variable x˜ is formed by the volumes of the hourly electricity pro-
duction of each electricity producer in the grid, another part of the components of the vector x˜ corresponds to the
capacities of the new sources of energy and new electricity storage systems to be developed in the time segment
under consideration, whereas the other components are auxiliary variables,
b) components of the vector variable y are the prices for a unit volume of electricity that the grid customers
are ready to pay to the electricity producers,
c) components of the vector v are parameters that are used in the above game model,
d) the matrix D is that of a linear operator that maps a set of the vectors y into an auxiliary set in a ﬁnite-
dimensional space of the same dimension as that of the vectors x˜, and
e) M˜ and Ω are polyhedra, which are deﬁned by systems of linear inequalities M˜ =
{
x˜ ≥ 0 : A˜x˜ ≥ b˜
}
and
Ω = {y ≥ 0 : By ≥ d} (where A˜, B are matrices whose elements are some parameters of the electrical grid, and
b˜, d are vectors of such parameters).
In this game, all the electricity producers in the grid, which form a collective player in the game, try to
maximize their revenue by choosing the volumes of electricity to be supplied that are acceptable to the consumers
in the grid. The other collective player in this game is formed by all the electricity consumers, who try to minimize
their expenditure associated with buying electricity in volumes acceptable to them.
As proven in [1], the pair of the vectors (x˜∗, y∗) ∈ M˜ × Ω form a Nash equilibrium point in the game if and
only if there exist vectors z∗ ≥ 0 and t∗ ≥ 0 such that the pairs of the vectors (z∗, x˜∗) and (t∗, y∗) are solutions to
the linear programming problems
〈
d, z
〉
+
〈
v, x˜
〉→ max
(z,x˜)∈{(z,x˜)≥0: zB≤x˜D, A˜x˜≥b˜},
〈−b, t〉→ min
(t,y)∈{(t,y)≥0: tA˜≤−v−Dy, By≥d},
forming a dual pair.
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A detailed description of all the variables and parameters of the mathematical model underlying the above
game, along with the proof of the above assertion, is presented in [1]. One of the features of this mathematical
model consists of taking into consideration daily and seasonal changes in the electricity demand while remaining
within the size of the model allowing one to solve the linear programming problems forming the dual pair in a
time acceptable in practical calculations with the use of widely available standard software. That is, this demand
is averaged by partitioning the time segment of several years (in which all the electricity producers and consumers
in the grid interact [1]) into a set of so-called “typical” periods of several kinds. This partitioning is done in
such a manner that the above-mentioned time segment turns out to be divided into “typical” periods each of
which is repeated several times within each year from this time segment. Here, each “typical” period of each
kind reﬂects regularities of the customers’ demand attributed to this period, and each “typical” period may last
for a certain number of days or even weeks. This demand is met with the use of both the existing electricity
generating and storing facilities and those to be developed as a result of the investments in volumes determined
by the equilibrium vectors (x˜∗, y∗). Thus, in [1], a game-theoretic approach to estimating the investment volume
in the grid and to ﬁnding optimal investment strategies in the ﬁrst situation, which is based on ﬁnding equilibrium
investment strategies by solving the above two-person, non-cooperative game, is proposed. A practical application
of this approach is demonstrated in [1]for an example that uses model data.
3. Developing economic mechanisms encouraging competition among service providers in tendering the
right for “wiring-up” customers of a regional electrical grid
When the local government in a region of a country or the central government of the country or both intent
to invest taxpayers’ money in any projects considered to be important for the region residents, including those in
developing the regional electrical grid or any of its parts, this government (governments) is (are) responsible to
the taxpayers on all the decisions it (they) makes (make) on the way the money is spent. “Wiring-up” particular
areas in the region, which is one of the permanently existing problems in practically any region as its population
grows and migrates, is one of the areas in which social interests related to the electrical grid functioning intersect
with business ones. Solving this problem requires establishing rules that would give enough freedom to the local
government authorities to promote a fair competition among all the interested businesses while encouraging these
businesses to compete.
While large customers buy electricity from wholesalers on a long-term contractual basis, small end customers
of the grid receive (buy) electricity mostly from distributors (retailers such as utility companies). In each fragment
of the grid, these distributors obtain electricity from the transmission lines (at substations within the transmission
network) and then deliver it to the end customers via low voltage lines. With storage facilities available throughout
the grid, the number of distribution companies “wiring-up” regions and municipalities of the country is likely to
increase. The conventional wisdom suggests that the distribution service (“wiring-up”) should be regulated, since
it is considered to be a natural monopoly under the existing deregulations (in the U.S., such as, for instance,
Energy Power Act of 1992, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order 888 of 1996, and the U.S. Supreme
Court decision of 2000, regarding this Order). Nevertheless, if this were to happen, at least with the appearance
of storage facilities throughout the grid, there would be enough room for developing incentives to compete for all
the companies interested in delivering electricity to end customers.
Thus, at least theoretically, tenders for the right to provide electricity for end customers from the transmission
network and storage facilities may eventually be held by both central and local authorities. As in any service
business, holding such tenders has the potential to both reduce prices for end customers and improve the quality
of the service. So it seems reasonable to explore whether local authorities would be interested in holding such
tenders.
Generally, most tenders are conducted in the form of sealed-bid auctions, and several rules for determining the
tender winner in such types of auctions may apply. The rules should encourage all the bidders to submit their true
values of the tendered right to “wire-up” end customers to the transmission network and storage facilities as their
bids. At the same time, these rules should discourage bidders who would like to win the tender at any cost from
submitting artiﬁcially excessive prices as their bids.
As is known, generally, Vickrey auctions, sometimes referred to as the second-price sealed-bid auctions, solve
the problem of encouraging the bidders to submit their real values of the subject of the bid in a single-step auction,
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provided that proﬁt is the only criterion to participate in the auction [2, 3]. However, Vickrey auctions may not
necessarily discourage the submission of excessive prices by some bidders, for instance, by those for whom win-
ning the tender even at a cost exceeding their values of the bid subject is still an acceptable and even a preferable
strategy. This may happen when such bidders pursue other goals besides maximizing their own proﬁt, such as,
for instance, undermining opportunities of other bidders to succeed in the market [2, 3, 4] . If this were the case,
in a particular tender, the absence of a mechanism discouraging the bidders from submitting excessive prices may
discourage reputable service companies to participate in the tender, since they may have no chance to win. As is
known, maximizing its own proﬁt may not necessarily be the best strategy for a surrounding that plays against a
coalition [5], so designing tender rules discouraging collusions among the bidders would contribute to equalizing
chances of all the tender participants to win.
The above-mentioned problem may emerge when a tender for particular work or a set of works, for instance,
for developing electricity transmission lines from remotely located alternative energy sources to a particular region
is set by local or central government authorities. An example of a rule for determining the winner in a sealed ceiling
bid in which a contract for providing services is oﬀered to a set of eligible bidders can be found in [6, 7]. This
rule is, in fact, an economic mechanism encouraging the bidders to submit bids (for the contract) that are close to
a (calculated) price desired by the auctioneer (or by the organizer of the bid) while discouraging the bidders from
submitting both damping prices and excessive ones. Under this rule, for each participating bidder, the probability
of winning the contract at a particular price desirable to the auctioneer (or to the bid organizer) turns out to be
higher than that under the traditional rule–when the contract is awarded to a bidder oﬀering the lowest price for
providing services stipulated in the contract. At the same time, for any bidder, the probability of winning the
contract at a price exceeding this particular price (desirable to the auctioneer or to the bid organizer) turns out to
be lower than that of winning the contract at this price.
The above-mentioned particular economic mechanism can be modiﬁed for organizing sealed-bid auctions for
the right to “wire-up” particular regions, municipalities, etc., as well as those for other works relating to devel-
oping the national electrical grid in principle. Yet, developing new such mechanisms, as well as the mechanisms
reducing the chances of forming corrupt ties, particularly, in the framework of possible public procurement activi-
ties associated with developing the grid remains challenging. One such mechanism, which reduces the chances of
forming corrupt ties is proposed in [7] though this mechanism is not resistant to corrupt ties that may be formed
between a cartel and a public administration. Also, since the right to provide several services associated with
developing the grid may be tendered by a public administration in the form of packages, mechanisms for combi-
natorial auctions–under which packages of goods or services are tendered–are needed. Some examples of such
general mechanisms are well known [8], whereas some particular mechanisms, for instance, the one for optimally
partitioning all the needed works into a set of lots to be tendered can easily be developed.
4. Forming a public-private partnership in making a sizable investment in a regional electrical grid
As is known [9], public-private partnership (PPP) problems are those actively studied in economics, since the
goals of these two sectors of any national economy not always coincide, and PPP is an economic mechanism that
helps harmonize these goals. When a sizable investment in developing an electrical grid is needed, whereas neither
the local government nor the central government (nor both of them) can secure the needed investment alone, and
private investors interested in this market cannot secure the needed investment alone either, a PPP may make a
diﬀerence.
However, to consider whether to deal with the central or with the local government (or with both) in the
framework of a PPP of any kind, private investors need the government (or both governments) to guarantee them
certain conditions of their participation in this PPP. Such conditions should make the private sector investments in
the grid at least comparable (in terms of the level of proﬁt) with other possible investments that interested private
investors may make. So to make possible the formation of any PPP to provide sizable investment in electrical grids,
one should estimate whether such a partnership can be formed in principle, proceeding from a) the conditions that
the government (governments) can oﬀer to potential private investors in the grid, and b) the options to allocate
ﬁnancial resources that the private investors have at the time of considering the government’s (governments’) oﬀer
to form this PPP.
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For instance, the intent of the government (governments) to develop the grid by incorporating storage facilities
and renewable sources of energy in it may be diﬃcult to implement by the government (governments) on its (their)
own due to ﬁnancial reasons. However, the private sector may not be interested in investing in the corresponding
projects or may consider any investments in these projects to be too risky ﬁnancially. If this is the case, economic
mechanisms encouraging the formation of a PPP between the public and the private sector are needed. Once
the use of such mechanisms has generated a mutual interest in both parties to consider whether a potential PPP
may be a) proﬁtable enough to the private sector, and b) socially and ﬁnancially beneﬁcial to the government
(governments), tools for estimating the economic eﬀectiveness of this PPP should to be available.
It turns out [9], that under certain natural, numerically veriﬁable assumptions, the analysis of the possibility
to form an economically proﬁtable PPP can mathematically be conducted by considering a three-person game on
a polyhedral set of connected player strategies [10] with payoﬀ functions of the players being linear functions of
vector arguments. Moreover, an auxiliary game can be formed for this three-person game in such a manner that
components of an equilibrium point in the auxiliary game can be used to construct an equilibrium point in the
initial game. Thus, since necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium points in the auxiliary game are
veriﬁable, these conditions turn out to be veriﬁable suﬃcient conditions of equilibrium points in the initial game
(though these conditions are not necessary ones for the initial game) [9].
The problem of analyzing the possibility to form a particular PPP for the purpose of investing in developing
a regional electrical grid can be stated as follows: Both the local and the central governments are interested
in developing a regional electrical grid (being part of the country’s electrical grid), and they determine that n
projects relating to particular parts of the grid or to particular functions of it should be developed. They try to
convince private investors to ﬁnance the projects, and they plan to invite a management company to handle the
implementation of these projects once the projects got ﬁnanced. Upon the completion of the projects, the local
government plans to tender the right to operate the objects, for instance, new storing systems, new generators, new
solar and wind power stations, etc., to be created as a result of implementing the projects. Contracts for the right
to operate these objects will be paid for by the tender winners, and these winners will be able to recuperate the
money to be paid to the local government from the revenue to be generated as a result of running the developed
objects during a certain period of time. Moreover, within this period of time, the local government also expects to
return (with certain percentages to be stipulated at the time of negotiating the PPP) the invested capital to all its
PPP partners. Once this period of time is over, the local government will continue to receive revenue from new
owners of the created objects in the form of taxes, and the size of these taxes is to be in line with existing laws
[10].
Proceeding from a) the investment volume needed for each of n projects on developing the grid, b) the invest-
ment volume that the government (governments) can secure for each project and in total, along with the estimate
of the minimum investment volume needed by these n projects in total, c) the expected yearly revenue from the
functioning of each project, d) the volume of ﬁnancing expected to be requested by the management company,
e) the investment volume that the private sector can oﬀer for ﬁnancing each project and in total, and f) a set of
ﬁnancial parameters determining conditions under which the government (governments) wishes (wish) to form a
PPP, one can form a system of constraints determining a set of player strategies for each of the three players in the
game of forming the PPP for investing in the grid—the government (governments), a group of interested private
investors, and the management company. These strategies are connected, their sets form a polyhedron in a ﬁnite-
dimensional space, and the payoﬀ functions of the game players turn out to be linear ones of the corresponding
vector arguments [9]. Under certain natural assumptions [9], this three-person game takes the form
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a − 〈ω,w〉 − 〈χ, x〉 → maxx
〈(σ, 0) ,w〉 → maxw
g − 〈(0, τ)w〉 → maxw
Aw + Bx ≥ h
(4.1)
where a) components of the vector x are the investment volumes that the government (governments) can oﬀer for
each of n projects associated with the grid development, b) each component from a part of components of the
vector w reﬂects the investment volume that the private sector can oﬀer for the corresponding project, c) each
component from the rest of components of the vector w is the volume of ﬁnancing that the management company
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requests for managing the corresponding project, d) τ, χ, σ, and ω are vectors of the above-mentioned ﬁnancial
parameters of the PPP, stipulated by the government (governments), e) a and g are positive, real numbers reﬂecting
the revenue expected to be received from the functioning of all the n projects (within the above-mentioned period
of time) by the government (governments) and by the group of private investors, respectively, and f) A, B, and
h are matrices and a vector or corresponding dimensions, where the matrix elements and the vector components
are formed by units, zeros, and real numbers calculated with the use of some of the above-mentioned ﬁnancial
parameters.
An auxiliary two-person game on a polyhedral set of connected player strategies
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a − 〈ω,w〉 − 〈χ, x〉 → maxx
g − 〈(0, τ)w〉 + 〈(σ, 0) ,w〉 → maxw
Aw + Bx ≥ h
(4.2)
is introduced, and as proven in [9], every pair of vectors that is an equilibrium point in Game 4.2 is an equilibrium
point in Game 4.1. In any game on a polyhedral set of connected player strategies S = {(x, y) ≥ 0 : Kx + Ly ≥ h}
with the payoﬀ function φ(x, y) = 〈p, x〉 + 〈q, y〉, where p, q, x, y, h are vectors, and K, L are matrices of
corresponding dimensions, the pair of vectors is called an equilibrium point if the inequalities
φ(x∗, y) ≤ φ(x∗, y∗) ≤ φ(x, y∗) ∀(x∗, y) ∈ S , ∀(x, y∗) ∈ S
hold [11].
As proven in [11], equilibrium points in Game 4.2 exist if and only if an auxiliary system of quadratic inequal-
ities ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Th ≥ δ,
〈h,H1h〉 + 〈ρ, h〉 = 0,
〈h,H2h〉 + 〈ρ, h〉 = 0,
where T is a matrix, H1 and H2 are symmetric quadratic matrices, whereas ρ, δ and h are vectors of correspond-
ing dimensions and structures, is solvable. These necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium points
in Game 4.2 let one reduce ﬁnding equilibrium points in this game to solving so-called quadratic optimization
problems [12], which can be done by methods of non-diﬀerentiable optimization, proposed in [12].
5. Conclusion
1. Though, in many countries, the electrical grid accounts for a sizable part of the energy consumption,
providing investments even in regional electrical grids, especially in traditional electricity generators, presents a
problem due to both the scale of the investment needed and risks associated with uncertainties in the electricity
demand and with rapidly developing technologies for receiving electricity from renewable sources of energy. The
necessity to properly manage the taxpayers’ money within the existing laws by government agencies responsible
for providing the population of a region with electricity and the above-mentioned risks for private investors require
developing a) economic mechanisms that would encourage potential investors to at least consider investing in the
grid, and b) particular tools for quantitatively evaluating the eﬀectiveness of these mechanisms. Game-theoretic
approaches to developing such tools seem promising, since they allow one to take into consideration conﬂict
interests of the electricity suppliers and consumers. Moreover, when sets of player strategies can be described
by linear constraints of a balance kind or by convex constraints allowing their linearization, for some classes of
games on polyhedral sets with nonlinear payoﬀ functions, equilibrium player strategies can be calculated with the
use of well-developed optimization techniques many of which are implemented in the form of standard software
packages.
2. Establishing both suﬃcient and necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the equilibria even in games on
polyhedral sets presents considerable diﬃculties, as, for instance, this turns out to be the case for games with
connected player strategies. So searching for classes of solvable games that describe any aspects of functioning
of particular regional electrical grids seems reasonable. This search implies conducting an appropriate systems
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analysis of investment problems arising in studying the functioning of regional electrical grids, and results of
this analysis may help design new or choose known mathematical models and techniques to solve mathematical
problems formulated on the basis of these models.
References
[1] A. S. Belenky, D. S. Bolkunov, An equilibrium analysis of investment opportunities in a regional electrical grid, Energy Systems (2016)
1–36doi:10.1007/s12667-016-0192-x.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12667-016-0192-x
[2] D. Mishra, D. C. Parkes, Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations, Journal of Economic Theory 132 (1) (2007) 335–366.
[3] A. Blume, P. Heidhues, J. Lafky, J. Münster, M. Zhang, All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction, Games and Economic Behavior
66 (2) (2009) 729–741.
[4] Y. De Smet, Multi-criteria auctions without full comparability of bids, European Journal of Operational Research 177 (3) (2007) 1433–
1452.
[5] A. Belenky, Choosing a preferable strategy by the surrounding of a coalition in n-person games, Applied Mathematics Letters 16 (5)
(2003) 689 – 694. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0893-9659(03)00068-5.
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0893965903000685
[6] A. Belenky, Two rules of a sealed ceiling bid and their analysis by mathematical programming techniques, Computers & Mathematics
with Applications 52 (12) (2006) 1711 – 1732. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.camwa.2005.10.019.
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0898122106003531
[7] A. S. Belenky, Three quantitative management problems in public procurement and decision procedures for their analysis and solving,
Procedia Computer Science 17 (2013) 1142 – 1153, ﬁrst International Conference on Information Technology and Quantitative Manage-
ment. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2013.05.146.
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877050913002792
[8] P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, Combinatorial auctions, MIT Press, 2006.
[9] F. Aleskerov, A. Belenky, S. Vassilyev, Two mathematical models of a public-private partnership in developing natural resources, Elec-
tronic Journal «Georesources, geoenrgetics, geopolitics» (in Russian) 1–18.
[10] A. Belenky, The solvability of a three-person game 0n a polyhedral set of connected player strategies and the evaluation of a possibility to
form a public-private partnership for implementing large-scale projects, in: Proceedings of The All-Russian meeting on control problems,
Instritute of Control Scineces Raussain Academy of Sciences (in Russian), Moscow, 2014.
[11] A. Belenky, A 2-person game on a polyhedral set of connected strategies, Computers & Mathematics with Applications 33 (6) (1997) 99
– 125. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0898-1221(97)00037-0.
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0898122197000370
[12] N. Shor, Quadratic optimization problems, Sov. J. Comput. System Sci. (formerly: Engineering Cybernetics) 6 (1987) 1–11.
